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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

DANIEL LEE KEENER

:

v.

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 20070485-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment of conviction for one count of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-3 /'-Ki I n a)(iii) (2002); ..;, :
of a. <
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i miiu degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-

112.5 (2003), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred .;u»n ih:>«'. >n:
pursuant
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See Addendum A (Judgment and

Conviction).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: 1

i denying Mr. Keener's motion to suppress the

search warrant where the search warrant contained intentional or reckless misstatements
and uncorroborated hearsay statements and failed to establish probable cause requiring
the warrant u> i . ^uppiessed under bmli Ihe fedend and slate eonstiti itions.

Standard of Review: When reviewing whether the search warrant supported by
affidavit has been issued with an adequate showing of probable cause, this Court
"review[s] the district court's assessment of the magistrate's probable cause
determination for correctness and ask[s] whether the district court erred in concluding
that the magistrate had a substantial basis for [his] probable cause determination." State
v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ^[14, n.2, 48 P.3d 872; see State v. Babbel 770 P.2d 987, 991
(Utah 1989). This Court "should consider [the] search warrant affidavit 'in its entirety
and in a common-sense fashion.'" Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (citations omitted). The
magistrate's decision should be given "'great deference.'" Id. (citations omitted).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Appellant, Daniel Lee Keener, preserved his argument that the search warrant
supported by affidavit containing omissions and misstatements lacked an adequate
showing of probable cause atR. 60-88; 108-09; 121-66; 167-171; 221; 222.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following constitutional provisions are determinative of the issue
on appeal: U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, §14. The text of these provisions is
located in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 20, 2005, Keener was charged by Information with one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-3. On July 13, 2006, a
preliminary hearing was held where Keener was bound over. R. 39-40. The trial court
2

granted the state's motion to amend the Information. R. 39-40. The state amended the
Information, charging Keener with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, a third degree felony, two counts of endangerment of a child or elder
adult, both third degree felonies, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor. R. 41-43. On July 14, 2006, the state filed a second amended
Information, charging an additional count of endangerment of a child or elder adult. R.
44-46.
On August 23, 2006, Keener filed a motion to suppress evidence from the search
of his residence on the basis that the search warrant was invalid because the affidavit
used in support of the warrant contained intentional or reckless misstatements and lacked
probable cause for the search. R. 60-88. A copy of the affidavit is attached as
Addendum C. The state filed a memorandum in opposition to Keener5s motion to
suppress. R. 89-102. On October 11, 2006, a suppression hearing was held in the matter.
R. 108-09; 221. The court invited the state to submit a supplemental memorandum
addressing Keener's argument made under Utah's Constitution. R. 110-120; 221:48-49.
The court allowed Keener the opportunity to respond to the state's supplemental
memorandum. R. 121-166; 221:49. On November 8, 2006, the trial court issued its
decision denying Keener's motion to suppress. R. 167-71. A copy of the trial court's
memorandum is attached as Addendum D.
On March 12, 2007, Keener entered into a conditional plea for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and endangerment of a child
or elder adult, both third degree felonies. R. 204; 222. Keener reserved the right to
3

appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 222:2. On May 4, 2007, the
trial court sentenced Keener to two indeterminate terms not to exceed five years on both
counts, consecutive. R. 210-12. The prison terms were suspended and Keener was placed
on probation for 36 months. R. 210-12. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 20, 2005, the stated charged Keener by Information with unlawful
possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 13. After the preliminary hearing, the Information was amended, charging Keener with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree
felony; three counts of endangerment of a child or elder adult, third degree felonies; and
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 44-46. The
amended charges were based on a probable cause statement set forth in the Information:
The written report of Salt Lake [C]ity Police Officer D. Teerlink that
on December 9, 2005, he assisted in the service of a Search Warrant [at]
that home [of] defendant Daniel Lee Keener, located at 849 North Sir
Phillip Drive, Salt Lake County, Utah.
A search of the defendant's bedroom revealed scales, and large
quantities of marijuana.
The defendant's two minor children, A.R.K. (DOB 1/23/95) and
E.M.K. (DOB 1/26/96) live at the residence with the defendant. J.B.,
(DOB 2/12/03) was also present in the home. Marijuana was located in the
defendant's bedroom next to his child's crib.
The statements of the defendant that he gives marijuana to relatives.
R.46.
Keener filed a motion to suppress challenging the affidavit in support of the search
warrant. R. 60-88. Keener argued that the affidavit lacked sufficient probable cause to
allow the issuance of a search warrant in violation of the federal and Utah constitutions.
4

R. 60-88. Specifically, Keener argued that the affidavit was based on misinformation as
it referred to the informant as a "concerned citizen" rather than an individual
apprehended while trying to pawn a stolen ring, failed to disclose the informant's
criminal history, and failed to corroborate the informant's allegations. R. 60-88.
The affidavit prepared by Detective Doug Teerlink stated in relevant part
the following:
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer
for over 5 years. Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City
Police Department's Narcotic Unit and investigates narcotic related
offenses. Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and in the
investigation of narcotic related offenses through the Utah Police Academy
and the California Narcotics Association. Your affiant's specialized
training includes the DEA Clandestine Laboratory Course. Your affiant
has worked street level drug interdiction as an arresting officer and as an
undercover police officer. Your affiant has seen several different types of
narcotics during these operations. Your affiant has been involved with over
400 drug related cases, many of which were felonies.
Within the last 6 hours your affiant has received information from a
concerned citizen named Gary Lambson. Mr. Lambson stated that there is
stolen jewelry at the address of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. He also stated
that the individuals who reside or otherwise occupy 849 North Sir Phillip
Drive are engaging in an ongoing narcotics distribution operation.
On 12/6/05 Mr. Lambson met with Daniel V. Keener for the purpose of
buying jewelry. Daniel V. Keener traveled with Mr. Lambson to 849 North
Sir Phillip Drive. Mr. Lambson was told that this was Daniel V. Keener's
son's residence. The son is named Daniel Lee Keener. Inside the residence
Daniel V. Keener retrieved a bag of jewelry. Mr. Lambson said the bag
contained rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets. Mr. Lambson purchased
a ring for $50 from Daniel V. Keener. Mr. Lambson said Daniel V. Keener
put some of the jewelry in his pocket and left most of the jewelry in the bag
at the listed residence.
While in the residence of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive, Mr. Lambson
observed the following items on a table in the back room; two large bags of
marijuana and a triple beam scale. He said one of the bags contains chronic
5

marijuana. Chronic is high quality marijuana. The other bag contains
lower grade marijuana. Mr. Lambson said that Daniel Lee Keener is selling
the marijuana out of the listed residence.
On 12/8/05 Mr. Lambson took the ring he purchased to Mike's Custom
Jewelry and Repair at 254 East 6400 South for the purpose of selling it.
The clerk at Mike's Jewelry recognized the ring as the one that belongs to
another employee of Mike's Jewelry named Julie Baker. Mrs. Baker
identified the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of her
vehicle along with other jewelry on 11/5/05 at 145 West Pierpont Avenue
(Salt Lake City case number 05-193011). The police responded to Mike's
Jewelry and questioned Mr. Lambson.
Your affiant showed Mr. Lambson the list of Jewelry stolen during the
previously mentioned vehicle burglary. Mr. Lambson identified a yellow
and white gold diamond ring and a Blue turquoise stretch bracelet as items
he saw in Daniel V Keener bag of jewelry at the listed residence.
Your affiant considers the information received from the concerned citizen
to be accurate and reliable because:
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his
name, date of birth and criminal history. Your affiant informed Mr.
Lambson that if he gave your affiant any false information he would be
charged with interfering with an investigation.
Your affiant has checked police and state records and found that Daniel V.
Keener has been arrested numerous times for Possession of a Controlled
Substance, the most recent arrest was on 5/5/2002. He was also arrested for
Carrying a Loaded Fire Arm in a Vehicle on 6/30/89. Your affiant has also
found that Daniel Lee Keener's drivers license shows the address of 849
North Sir Phillip Drive. Daniel Lee Keener has been arrested for numerous
thefts including an Aggravated Burglary on 02/26/2000, numerous drug
charges (the most recent on 05/12/05) and Strong Arm Robbery.
Your affiant desires to enter 849 North Sir Phillip Drive and search for
stolen jewelry, marijuana, marijuana paraphernalia and other items related
to the distribution of marijuana. The paraphernalia includes such items as
pipes, bongs or tubes used to inhale or smoke marijuana. Other related
items include packaging material used to package marijuana and scales
used to weigh quantities. Your affiant knows from training and experience
that these items are almost always found on the premises where search
warrants for controlled substances have been executed.
6

Your affiant desires to search for records of stolen jewelry and marijuana
sales, both written and electronic, residency papers and U.S. currency.
Your affiant knows from past experiences with narcotic investigations that
persons sometimes record their sales to show dates, amounts purchased and
drug indebtedness. Your affiant knows from training and experience that
stolen jewelry and marijuana is sold for U.S. currency. The concerned
citizen purchased the stolen ring with U.S. currency.
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for
presentation to the court by Deputy District Attorney Blake Hills.
R. 79-81; see Addendum C. Another affidavit in support of a search warrant for the
residence of Daniel V. Keener, Appellant's father who occupied a different residence
than Appellant, was prepared by another detective, Michael Hardin, on the same day as
the affidavit at issue in this case.1 R. 82-88; see Addendum E. In the affidavit prepared
by Detective Hardin, the detective described the informant, Gary Lambson, as an
individual "who was detained by Murray Police, concerning a stolen ring." R. 83.
During the motion to suppress hearing, the judge asked Detective Teerlink if these two
"affidavits [were] submitted to Judge Atherton simultaneously?" R. 221:26. The
detective answered, "Yes, they were." R. 221:26.
Keener argued that the court could not look beyond the four corners of the
affidavit applicable to this case in determining whether probable cause existed in support
of the search warrant issued for Appellant's residence. R. 221:14-15. In denying

1

During the motion to suppress hearing, the state objected to references made to the
affidavit prepared by Detective Hardin stating, "I'm going to object to anything regarding
a different search warrant for a different case in a different instance referred by a
different detective. It had no bearing in relation to this case that we're here on today." R.
221:6.
7

Keener5 s motion to suppress, the trial court found "no misstatement" in the affidavit
stating the following:
Had Detective Teerlink's affidavit stood alone, his characterization of
Lambson as a "concerned citizen" would be troubling to the court. But it
did not stand alone; rather, it was submitted alongside Detective Hardin's
affidavit, which pointed out that Lambson had been "detained by Murray
Police" regarding "a stolen ring." Hardin Affidavit, p. 2. That reference in
Detective Hardin's affidavit, combined with Detective Teerlink's
knowledge that Judge Atherton would be reviewing both his and Detective
Hardin's affidavit together, dispelled any potential false impression. It is as
if the detectives defined "concern citizen" to mean Gary Lambson, a person
of interest detained by authorities.
R. 169. The trial court then concluded "that Judge Atherton 'had a substantial basis for
determining that probable cause existed and that evidence of illegal conduct would be
found at the' Sir Phillip Drive location." R. 169.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's denial of Mr. Keener's motion to suppress was erroneous where
an examination of the four corners of the detective's affidavit upon which the search
warrant was issued demonstrates that it was insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause to search Mr. Keener's residence. The evidence in this case shows that the
detective intentionally or reckless misinformed the magistrate regarding the status of the
informant, characterizing him as a "concerned citizen" rather than a criminal informant
thereby materially misrepresenting his reliability.
The informant was being held in police custody for his suspected role in the theft
of a ring that was stolen from a vehicle when he gave information to the detective
concerning alleged criminal activity at Mr. Keener's residence. Although the detective

8

was aware of the circumstances under which the informant gave this information and its
impact in lessening the reliability of that information, the detective failed to accurately
inform the court in his affidavit of these circumstances. Even if it were possible for the
court to look beyond the four corners of the affidavit to establish probable cause, the
evidence does not support the judge's finding that the affidavit in this case presented by
Detective Teerlink was read simultaneously by the magistrate with the affidavit presented
by a different detective concerning a different defendant, different residence and different
case when making her finding of probable cause or that the magistrate made any
connection between the two affidavits. Therefore, the trial court's finding was clearly
erroneous. Additionally, the evidence also demonstrates that the detective omitted
material information regarding the informant's criminal history and failed to corroborate
the details of the informant's allegations of criminal activity.
Because the detective's material misstatements and omissions were intentionally
or recklessly false and the affidavit otherwise fails to establish probable cause the fourth
amendment was violated and the evidence should have been suppressed. However, even
if probable cause did exist, article I, section 14 of Utah's Constitution requires the
evidence be suppressed where misstatements and omissions have been intentionally or
recklessly made to the court in order to secure a search warrant.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. KEENER'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE SEARCH WARRANT WHERE THE
WARRANT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE BUT
BASED ON AN AFFIDAVIT CONTAINING INTENTIONAL OR
RECKLESS MISINFORMATION AND UNCORROBORATED HEARSAY
STATEMENTS.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const, amend IV. The text of
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution contains identical language. Utah Const, art.
I, § 14In considering whether an affidavit supporting a search warrant gave the
magistrate a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause, Utah courts "' examine the
search warrant affidavit "in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion," deferring to the
magistrate's decision on whether the search warrant is supported by probable cause.55'
State v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, f 4, 81 P.3d 783 (quoting State v. Purser, 828 P.2d
515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted)). However, this Court has also stated
that it is "bound by the contents of the affidavit, [and] need not defer to the trial court's
finding." Id.(quotation and citation omitted); see also State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,
•J 9, 40 P.3d 1136 (noting that a Utah appellate court, "like the reviewing court below, is
bound by the contents of the affidavit. . . [and] make[s] an independent review of the
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trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written evidence"). In other words,
although this Court may defer to the magistrate's determination of probable cause, the
analysis on appeal is limited to the four corners of the affidavit in question, and this Court
owes no deference to the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Id.; Whiteley v.
Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971).
A search warrant based on an affidavit in support thereof "must articulate
particularized facts and circumstances leading to a conclusion that probable cause exists.
Mere conclusory statements will not suffice." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d at 990. The
standard requires sufficient evidence to support " c a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d
1303, 1304 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
A review of the magistrate's probable cause determination will "assess whether the
magistrate had a '"substantial basis' for determining that probable cause existed." State
v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, TJ14, 48 P.3d 872 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,
1259-60 (Utah 1993) (further quotations omitted)). "[T]he magistrate can only fulfill his
constitutional function if the information given to him is true." State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d
188, 190 (Utah 1986) ("[T]he obvious assumption behind the warrant requirement is that
the factual showing to support a finding of probable cause will be truthful.").
In challenges to the sufficiency of an affidavit based on an informant tip, the Utah
Supreme Court has adopted the same standard that is applied under federal law; namely,
the "flexible totality-of-the-circumstances standard" articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983). State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, Ijll, 104 P.3d 1265 (citations omitted).
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Under that analysis, Utah courts consider whether an affidavit contains detailed relevant
facts concerning the informant and the alleged criminal conduct. See Gates, 462 U.S. at
239; Babbell, 770 P.2d at 990-91; Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304-05.
Factors to consider in determining whether probable cause exists
include an informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. Gates,
462 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329; State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130
(Utah 1987); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In
some cases, the circumstances may require the supporting affidavit to set
forth in detail the basis of knowledge, veracity and reliability of a person
supplying information in order to establish probable cause. State v. Bailey,
675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). In other cases, if the circumstances as a
whole demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less strong
showing is required. Id. at 1205-06. For example, reliability and veracity
are generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives nothing
from the police in exchange for the information. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at
1206; Brown, 798 P.2d 286; State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah
App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Courts have also
consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the informant's
knowledge is based on personal observation. See Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130;
Brown, 798 P.2d at 287; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57. Further buttressing
reliability is the detail with which an informant describes the facts set forth
in the affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts by
police. See TState v.l Anderson, 701 P.2d [1099,] at 1102 [(Utah 1985)];
Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287.
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; see also. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, Tjl 1 ("The indicia of veracity,
reliability, and basis of knowledge are nonexclusive elements to be evaluated" in totality
of the circumstances analysis (abrogating the Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) three factor analysis in determining reliability and sufficiency of an
informant).
In the present case, the trial court concluded that "[h]aving reviewed Teerlink's
Affidavit in its entirety, . . . Judge Atherton 'had a substantial basis for determining that
probable cause existed and that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the' Sir
12

Phillip Drive location." R. 169. In concluding that probable cause existed, the trial court
determined that the question of whether an "'an intentional misstatement in an affidavit
supporting a warrant,'" material or otherwise '"requires suppression of the evidence'
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution" was left open because it found that
"no misstatement" was made by the detective. R. 169. In finding that no misstatement
had been made by the detective, the trial court looked beyond the four corners of the
Teerlink affidavit and noted that "[h]ad Detective Teerlink's affidavit stood alone, his
characterization of Lambson as a 'concerned citizen' would be troubling to the court. But
it did not stand alone; rather it was submitted alongside Detective Hardin's affidavit
[submitted to secure a search warrant of a different residence of a different individual],
which pointed out that Lambson had been 'detained by Murray Police' regarding 'a
stolen ring.' Hardin Affidavit, p.2." R. 169. The trial court determined that the reference
to Lambson in Detective Hardin's affidavit "combined with Detective Teerlink's
knowledge that Judge Atherton would be reviewing both his and Detective Hardin's
affidavits together, dispelled any potential false impression. It is as if the detectives
defined 'concerned citizen' to mean Gary Lambson, a person of interest detained by the
authorities." R. 169.
An examination of the four corners of the affidavit in question reveals that it was
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to search Mr. Keener's residence
because Detective Teerlink intentionally or recklessly (A) misinformed the magistrate
2

The trial court stated in a footnote that "a finding that the Sir Phillip Drive warrant was
constitutionally permissible under a state constitutional analysis necessarily means that it
was permissible under a federal constitutional analysis too." R. 169 n.3.
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regarding the status of the informant relied upon and failed to adequately corroborate the
informant's allegations of criminal activity; (B) omitted material information regarding
the informant's criminal history and (C) such intentional or reckless misstatements and
omissions require suppression of the evidence where they are material and the affidavit
otherwise failed to establish probable cause. The trial court's finding relying on
information outside the four corners of the affidavit was erroneous. Even if it were
permissible for the trial court to look beyond the four corners of the affidavit when
evaluating whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause,
the information relied upon by the trial court in making its finding is not supported by the
evidence. Because the detective's material misstatements and omissions were
intentionally or recklessly false and the affidavit otherwise fails to establish probable
cause, the evidence must be suppressed.
A. The Affidavit Failed to Support a Finding of Probable Cause Because it
Contained an Intentional or Reckless Material Misstatement
Characterizing Lambson as a "Concerned Citizen," Thereby
Misrepresenting the Reliability of the Informant, and Failed to
Corroborate the Details of the Alleged Criminal Activity.
The supreme court explained in State v. Nielsen, that "[t]he responsibility for
issuing warrants and for meeting the pertinent constitutional requirements that underlie
their issuance rests with the magistrate,. . . [but] the magistrate can only fulfill his
constitutional function if the information given to him is true." 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah
1986). For this reason, "[a] law enforcement officer must be aware not only of the need
for accuracy in the information provided to a magistrate in support of an application for a
search warrant, but also of the importance of absolute truthfulness in any statements
14

made under oath." Id. at 191. Additionally, "courts must be particularly vigilant in
assessing a claim that a police officer has misrepresented information in an affidavit
supporting the issuance of a search warrant." Id. at 190-91 (emphasis added).
In this case, the trial court erred when it concluded that Detective Teerlink's
affidavit provided a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause because it wrongly
characterized Mr. Lambson as a "concerned citizen," omitted material information
regarding the informant's criminal history, and failed to corroborate the details of the
informant's allegations of criminal activity. The trial court's factual finding that "no
misstatement" existed as Teerlink's affidavit "did not stand alone" but "was submitted
alongside Detective Hardin's affidavit" is erroneous because it is not supported by the
evidence and looks beyond the four corners of the Teerlink affidavit to support probable
cause.3 R. 169.

3

"c[F]actual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence' are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard." State v.
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, \\ 1, 100 P.3d 1222 (further quotation and citations omitted).
However, in Deluna, this Court stated that it is bound on review "by the contents of the
affidavit," and it will not defer to the trial court's findings in support of its denial to
suppress. 2001 UT App 401, *|{9, 40 P.3d 1136. Under the four corners rule limiting
review to the contents of the affidavit alone, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause.
Similarly, under the clearly erroneous standard, the evidence fails to support the trial
court's finding that the magistrate reviewed the affidavits together to "dispel[]" the false
information conveyed establishing probable cause. R. 169. Appellant argues that under
the circumstances of this case, involving a judge made finding, the marshaling rule
should not be implicated. Rather, the standard employed is whether the finding is against
the clear weight of the evidence. Weighing evidence to determine whether the evidence
is against the clear weight of evidence involves a different review standard than
marshaling the evidence and considering it in the light most favorable to the finding. In
other words, considering whether a finding is against the clear weight of the evidence
requires reviewing all of the evidence, without weighing it in favor of the finding, and the
finding can be against the clear weight of evidence, even if the marshaled evidence would
15

On December 9, 2005, Detective Teerlink submitted an affidavit to Judge
Atherton stating in part that he had "received information from a concerned citizen
named Gary Lambson. Mr. Lambson stated that there is stolen jewelry at the address of
849 North Sir Phillip Drive. He also stated that the individuals who reside or otherwise
occupy 849 North Sir Phillip Drive are engaging in an ongoing narcotics distribution
operation." R. 79. Detective Teerlink stated in the affidavit that he "considered] the
information received from the concerned citizen to be accurate and reliable because:
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his
name, date of birth and criminal history. Your affiant informed Mr.
Lambson that if he gave your affiant any false information he would be
charged with interfering with an investigation.
R. 80.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Teerlink testified that he prepared the
search warrant for Mr. Keener's residence, 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. R. 221:22. The
detective testified that he became involved in this investigation after
Detective Hardin[ ] contacted me and explained that he had a - that there
was a gentleman that he had in custody at the time, Mr. Lambson; and he
said that he had a residence that had some—told me that there were some
drugs there, some stolen jewelry, and asked me for my assistance.
R. 221:22. The detective believed he was contacted for his help because he "had
experience in writing search warrants and experience in narcotics." R. 221:23.
Detective Teerlink testified that he interviewed Mr. Lambson at the Salt Lake City Police
Department. R. 221:23. The detective stated that the only thing he "promised [Mr.
support the finding. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Although
marshaling the evidence seems contrary to a weight of evidence review, with an
abundance of caution, Appellant nevertheless marshals the evidence for this Court.
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Lambson was] that if he lied to me in any way about the investigation, . . . I would charge
him for false information and interfering in an investigation." R. 221:23. The detective
testified that no other promises were made to Mr. Lambson but stated
Mr. Lambson was detained that evening while the search warrant - until
after the search warrant was served. I contacted Detective Hardin[ ] and
suggested that since I had put his name - Mr. Lambson's name in the
search warrant, that it would not be a good idea to book him into jail with
the same people that he was - that he'd given us information on. Then I
suggested that we - 1 suggested later to him that we not file charges.
R. 221:24.
The detective testified that he used Mr. Lambson5 s name in the affidavit because
"without his name in the search warrant, it - I didn't feel like we had enough probable
cause, and that we needed his name to make him - you know, if we just said an
anonymous informant, then it would not be - we didn't have enough probable cause. R.
221:25. The detective testified that he used the term "concerned citizen" rather than
"confidential informant" "because he was not signed up as a confidential informant.
[He'd] never done any buys with him. [He] hadn't made any promises to him." R.
221:25. The detective testified that he used the term concerned citizen because he did not
feel Mr. Lambson fit the guidelines normally used for confidential informants. R.
221:26. On cross-examination, the detective admitted that he knew that informants
termed as "concerned citizens" were accorded more reliability than those termed criminal
informants. R. 221:26. The detective stated his intent was to put Mr. Lambson in a "box
that seemed to fit him in my mind." R. 221:30.
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The trial judge then asked the detective whether "the affidavits [were] submitted to
Judge Atherton simultaneously?" R. 221:26. The detective said "Yes, they were." R.
221:26. This single question by the judge was the only evidence presented in support of
the trial court's finding that Detective Teerlink's affidavit did not stand alone. R. 169.
This affirmation of the judge's question does not support the trial court's finding that
Detective Teerlink had "knowledge that Judge Atherton would be reviewing both his and
Detective Hardin's affidavits together, dispel[ing] any potential false impression." R.
169. Detective Teerlink did not testify that he knew that the affidavits were in fact read
simultaneously or that the affidavits cross referenced each other to establish probable
cause, only that he presented his affidavit at the same time Detective Hardin presented his
affidavit regarding another defendant in another case. There is no evidence that these
affidavits were given alone by each detective or with multiple other affidavits as is the
common practice when seeking search warrants. Presumably when different officers
present different affidavits dealing with different defendants and cases, a busy magistrate
is not necessarily going to connect the two affidavits together. In fact, the magistrate
could have been presented with a number of other affidavits at the same time and there is
no evidence that the magistrate did in fact make any connection between the two
affidavits in question here. The state did not present any further evidence regarding the
affidavit submitted by Detective Hardin dealing with facts from a different case. Notably,
both the state and defense counsel argued during the suppression hearing that references
to the affidavit prepared by Detective Hardin "regarding a different search warrant for a
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different case in a different instance referred by a different detective" had no bearing on
this case. R. 221:6.
The marshaled evidence, therefore, does not support the judge's finding that the
affidavit in this case, presented by Detective Teerlink, was read simultaneously by the
magistrate with the affidavit presented by Detective Hardin concerning a different
defendant, different residence and different case when making a finding of probable
cause. And, the judge's finding that the affidavit was not misleading because Detective
Hardin's affidavit was presented at the same time is against the weight of the evidence
that shows that the officer intentionally or reckless used a more reliable informant label
so as to pass the probable cause test. Furthermore, reliance on information outside the
four corners of the affidavit is improper. Case law firmly establishes that probable cause
must be established based on the contents of the affidavit itself. Saddler, 2004 UT 105 at
1fl7; Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at | 9 .
In this case, the affidavit prepared by Detective Teerlink used to secure the search
warrant of Appellant's residence, intentionally or recklessly misinformed the magistrate
about the informant's status, which bore on his reliability and omitted material
information regarding the informant's criminal history, thus failing to support a finding
of probable cause. The detective's testimony regarding his knowledge that by terming
Mr. Lambson a "concerned citizen" the court would consider the information more
reliable together with his admission that he did not believe that probable cause could be
established by omitting Mr. Lambson's name from the affidavit, thus not even meeting
the reliability of a confidential informant, demonstrates the detective's intentional or
19

reckless intent to mislead the court. However, even if this Court determines that the
detective's misstatements were unintentionally or not recklessly made, the affidavit still
fails to establish probable cause because the information obtained came from a criminal
informant rather than a "concerned citizen," thus lowering the reliability of the hearsay
statements, and the detective failed to independently corroborate the informant's
allegations of criminal activity. Therefore, the evidence should be suppressed.
1.

The detective's intentional or reckless misstatements bore on the
informant's reliability materially affecting the affidavit.

When probable cause to search is predicated upon facts supplied by an informant,
part of the totality of the circumstances analysis includes determining the type of tip or
informant involved. State v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, Tf6, 81 P.3d 783. There are two
primary types of informant: the citizen-informant and the police informant (sometimes
called a criminal or confidential informant). Generally, "an ordinary citizen-informant
needs no independent proof of reliability or veracity." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at ^14
(citations and quotations omitted). A citizen-informant is "an average citizen who is in a
position to supply information by virtue of having been a crime victim or witness" and
relates the information to the police as a matter of civic duty. State v. White, 851 P.2d
1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotations and citations omitted); see also State v.
Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 822 (Neb. 1999) ("citizen informant... is a special status which
must be affirmatively alleged"); United States v. Mahler, 442 F.2d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.
1971) (stating that when the informant is the victim of the crime, no other facts are
necessary to show that informant is reliable).
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Alternatively, a police informant is one "who gains information through
involvement in criminal activity or who is motivated by pecuniary gain [and thus] is
lower on the reliability scale." State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, ^| 31, 996 P.2d 555
(internal quotations and citation omitted); see also State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 789
(Minn. 1999) (noting that "statements from citizen witnesses, as opposed to criminal
informants, may be presumed to be credible"); State v. Williams, 193 S.W.3d 502, 507
(Tenn. 2006) (noting the difference in reliability "between information provided by
'citizen' or 'bystander5 informants and information provided by 'criminal informants' or
an informant from a 'criminal milieu'" (citation omitted)). "Thus, experienced stool
pigeons or persons criminally involved or disposed are not regarded as 'citizeninformants' because they are generally motivated by something other than good
citizenship." See People v. Smith, 553 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1976) (citation omitted). "The
designation 'citizen-informant' is just as conclusionary as the designation 'reliableinformant.' In either case the conclusion must be supported by facts stated in the
affidavit." Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, an anonymous tip is "toward the low-end of
the reliability scale" because the tipster's "basis of knowledge and veracity are typically
unloiown." Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation
omitted) (abrogated on other grounds in Saddler, 2004 UT 105). On the other hand,
informants, who "give their full names, thus subjecting themselves to a penalty for
providing false information," are more reliable than those who remain anonymous.
Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at ^[15.
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In determining whether an informant is a citizen-informant or police informant, it
is important to consider whether the informant was part of the criminal environment,
which would lower his reliability. See State v. Goldberg, 872 A.2d 378, 383 (Vt. 2005)
("Our cases attaching a presumption of reliability to named citizen informants expressly
distinguish between citizens who simply come forward in the interest of law
enforcement, and informants who have a preexisting relationship with the police.").
Another consideration in determining the informant reliability is whether the informant
provided information against his penal interest. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,
583 (1971) (holding statements "against the informant's penal interest" "carry their own
indicia of credibility")).
When an affidavit is based primarily on information obtained from an informant,
the supreme court has recognized that
[A]n informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are but two
relevant considerations, among others, in determining the existence of
probable cause under "a totality-of-the-circumstances." They are not strict,
independent requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every case. A
weakness in on or the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in the
totality there is a substantial basis to find probable cause.
Saddler, 2004 UT 105, Ifl 1, 104 P.3d 1265. Factors looked at when evaluating the
sufficiency of an affidavit based on information given by an informant are any
corroborating details, statements against penal interest, participation in criminal activity,
and personal observations made by the informant. Id. at ^5.
In Saddler, the supreme court held under the totality of the circumstances present
the "affidavit set[] forth sufficient underlying circumstances to support the reliability and
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credibility of the confidential informant and [the detective's] corroborative efforts." 2004
UT 105 at Yfl6, 27. Even though this affidavit set forth sufficient details to bolster the
confidential informant's reliability, including the informant's statements against his penal
interest and personal observation, the court noted that "even if the confidential
informant's reliability were in question, this would not necessarily be fatal to the warrant
under the totality-of-the-circumstances standard." Id. at ^ 1 8 , 21, 26. An affidavit based
on an anonymous informant can support a finding of probable cause where the police are
"able to corroborate" "the detailed information" given. Id In Saddler, the detective
detailed his "significant" corroborative efforts in the affidavit in addition to "verifying]
other, more innocent details provided by the confidential informant" such as the vehicles
present at the home, the vehicles registered owners, and Saddler's place of employment.
Id. at ffij 18-19, 22, 24.
An examination of these factors outlined above demonstrates that the affidavit in
this case was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause because Mr. Lambson
was not an inherently reliable informant. For example, Mr. Lambson was not a
"concerned citizen" who came to the police with information about criminal activity "as a
matter of civic duty," (State v. White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) or
otherwise, thus, giving his statements an indicia of reliability requiring "no independent
proof of [their] reliability or veracity." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at ^14. Instead, Mr.
Lambson was detained for possession of a ring that was stolen from a vehicle. R. 168.
Mr. Lambson had taken the ring purchased for $50 from Daniel V. Keener, Appellant's
father, to a jewelry store and had attempted to sell it. R. 79, 168. And Mr. Lambson was
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in police custody for his suspected role in the theft of the ring at the same time Detective
Teerlink was seeking a search warrant based on information from Mr. Lambson, but
depicting Mr. Lambson as a concerned citizen.
Detective Teerlink asserted that Gary Lambson was an accurate and reliable
source because he provided "his name, date of birth, and criminal history." R. 80. While
such information may bolster the reliability of an informant under some circumstances,
here Mr. Lambson provided his information and information regarding the stolen jewelry
and drugs at a time when he was under investigation for criminal conduct relating to the
incident and when in police custody. Accordingly, he is not entitled to the presumption
of reliability normally afforded to citizen informants with no connection to the police.
See State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, If 31, 996 P.2d 555 (noting that an "informant
who gains information through criminal activity . . . is lower on the reliability scale than
a citizen informant'5); see also United States v. Button, 653 F.2d 319, 326 (8th Cir. 1981)
(noting that "courts should be cautious in accepting the assertion that one who apparently
was present when narcotics were used or displayed is a presumptively reliable citizeninformer. .. . because as a general proposition it is an informant from the criminal milieu
rather than a law-abiding citizen who is most likely to be present under such
circumstances").
Furthermore, given the circumstances under which Mr. Lambson's provided his
statements, they cannot be considered statements against his penal interest, thus
increasing his reliability, because they did not subject him to any additional criminal
liability greater than what he was facing. Saddler, 2004 UT 105 at TJ20. In fact, his
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statements were aimed at lessening his criminal culpability and the sanctions he faced.
For example, in State v. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 2006), the Supreme Court of
Indiana held that an informant's statements that his cocaine supplier was Spillers and he
had recently purchased cocaine from him were not statements against his penal interests
and did not bolster the informant's reliability. Id. at 954-57. The criminal informant in
Spillers had been arrested for dealing or possession of cocaine as a result of a search
warrant being executed on his home. Id at 951-52. After his arrest, the informant told
detectives that Spillers was his drug source and had recently obtained cocaine from him
earlier that same day. Id. at 952. The informant also gave information regarding
Spillers5 girlfriend's address where he was staying and the make and model of his car.
Id. Spillers moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the affidavit was insufficient to
establish probable cause for a search warrant because the informant's credibility had not
been established nor had the statements been corroborated. Id. at 953. The state argued
that the informant's statements were not only corroborated but were made against his
penal interests. Id.
The court determined that unlike those cases where "an informant, after arrest or
confrontation by police, admitted committing criminal offenses under circumstances in
which the crimes otherwise would likely have gone undetected" the informant here "was
caught "c red-handed'" with drugs in his possession before naming his purported
supplier." Id. at 956. "Although [the informant] admitted committing additional crimes
of possession of cocaine, his tip was less a statement against his penal interest than an
obvious attempt to cuny favor with police." Id (citing Williamson v. United States, 512
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U.S. 594, 607-08 (1994) ("A person arrested in incriminating circumstances has a strong
incentive to shift blame or downplay his own role in comparison with that of others, in
hopes of receiving a shorter sentence and leniency in exchange for cooperation.")).
Therefore, the informant's statement was not a declaration against his penal interest
demonstrating his credibility because he had already been arrested for possession and
"his decision to reveal his source to police did not subject him to any additional criminal
liability.55 Id. at 957.
Similarly, in this case Mr. Lambson was not inherently reliable because he was
detained for trying to sell a stolen ring and subject to possible third degree felony
charges.4 The information he gave the detectives about Mr. Keener did not subject him
to additional criminal liability. Nor did the threat of being charged for giving false
information, a class B misdemeanor, increase his reliability. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8506 (2003); Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 957 n.8. (dismissing the state's argument that if the
informant had been found to have given false information he could have been prosecuted,
concluding that because the informant had been "arrested for either a Class A or a Class
C felony, his potential criminal liability for an additional misdemeanor offense was de
minimus55). Furthermore, the detective was acutely aware of the circumstances under
which Mr. Lambson was giving information about the stolen jewelry and drugs and its
impact in lessening the reliability of that information, yet he failed to accurately inform
4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003), Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, states in part
"A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen. . . .55 Theft is
a third degree felony if the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is
less than $5,000. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412.
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the court. The detective was also aware that categorizing Mr. Lambson as a "concerned
citizen" rather than a criminal informant would make him appear more reliable. The
detective's intentional or reckless misstatements regarding Mr. Lambson's informant
status bore on the reliability of the hearsay statements, materially affecting the affidavit.
However, even if this Court determines that these statements were not made
intentionally or recklessly, Mr. Lambson's statements were unreliable and could not
support a finding of probable cause. Although Mr. Lambson's unreliable statements
could not have stood alone, it may have been possible for his allegations to support a
finding of probable cause, if they had been adequately corroborated by independent
police investigation prior to the issuance of the search warrant. See Saddler, 2004 UT
105 at f 21. However, in this case the affidavit still lacked probable cause because, as set
forth below, Detective Teerlink failed to properly corroborate Mr. Lambson's allegations.
2.

The affidavit fails to support a finding of probable cause where the
detective failed to independently corroborate the unreliable hearsay
statements.

Because Detective Teerlink did not independently confirm any illegal activity, the
informant's tip in this case was not properly corroborated and therefore the affidavit was
insufficient to justify a search of Mr. Keener's residence. When an affidavit is based
primarily on a tip from an informant, Utah courts "expect police officers to make
significant independent corroborative efforts to confirm the information." State v.
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, «|[15, 37 P.3d 260. Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court has explained that the police must corroborate the allegations of criminal activity,
not merely an informant's description of a suspect's appearance or residence:
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An accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and
appearance is of course reliable in [a] limited sense: It will help the police
correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip,
however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed
criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip
be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a
determinate person.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000); see also United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d
831, 834 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the "[m]ere confirmation of innocent static
details in an anonymous tip does not constitute corroboration").
For example, in United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2005), six
affidavits were submitted seeking six search warrants of the defendant's different
residence where defendant was suspected of dealing drugs from. IcL at 530. The sixth
affidavit (the Frazier affidavit), seeking to search defendant's Jeffries Street residence,
described the defendant's criminal enterprise and gave the report of an anonymous
witness "CW-1" who had personally witnessed defendant selling drugs out of the housing
project. Id. The Frazier affidavit did not include information regarding the activities
caught on tape with a different confidential informant (CI-178) that the other five
affidavits had included. Id, No substantial corroboration of the anonymous witness CW1 statements were made by the agent. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the Frazier
affidavit based on lack of probable cause, which was granted. Id.
The court reiterated established case law that when reviewing the "sufficiency of
the evidence supporting probable cause [it] is limited to the information presented in the
four-corners of the affidavit" and therefore "may not consider in this analysis [the
agent's] testimony that CI-178 recorded the [drug] transactions" because the Frazier
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affidavit did not include the information. Id. at 531. The court noted that as part of its
totality of the circumstances analysis it must consider the confidential informants
veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge.
While independent corroboration of a confidential informant's story is not a
sine qua non to a finding of probable cause, in the absence of any indicia of
the informants' reliability, courts insist that the affidavit contain substantial
independent police corroboration.
Id. at 532 (citations omitted). The court noted that the agent failed to include any
evidence of corroboration of the informant information or evidence of the confidential
informant's reliability. Id. Because none of the informants' statements were corroborated
other than observations that Frazier was "coming and going from his residence on Jeffries
Street" "and a search of his telephone records reveal[ing] that he was in constant contact
with known drug dealers," the court concluded that the district court correctly suppressed
the Frazier affidavit. Id. at 532-33.
State v. Detroy, 72 P.3d 485, 488 (Haw. 2003), also shows that when an
informant's statements are low on the reliability scale, substantial independent
corroboration must be done by the officers in order to establish probable cause. In
Detroy, a detective received an anonymous tip that described the location of the
defendant's residence and alleged that he "may [have been] growing marijuana there."
Id. The informant claimed that he had smelled "the odor of marijuana plants" and had
"observed through [defendant's open windows, in the room that contained an air
conditioner, a very bright white light. . . . [and] the tops of marijuana plants." Id The
informant also provided a physical description of the suspect. Id. Upon independent
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investigation, however, the detective only "ascertained that (1) [informant's description
of the apartment and windows was accurate, (2) [informant's description of [defendant
substantially matched the computer information he accessed, and (3) lights could be
observed throughout the apartment except for the room with the air conditioner." Id. at
492. The Hawai'i Supreme Court noted that the detective "was unable to verify the
incriminating aspects of the tip. [The detective] failed to (1) detect the odor of marijuana
plants, (2) observe bright lights in [defendant's back room, [or] (3) see the tops of
marijuana plants in [defendant's apartment." Id. Therefore, the court concluded that "to
the extent corroborated, the tip did not provide probable cause." Id
Additionally, in State v. Goldberg, 872 A.2d 378, 380 (Vt. 2005), further
demonstrates that uncorroborated information from a unreliable criminal informant does
not establish probable cause. In Goldberg, the police received a tip from an informant
"about a marijuana growing operation." Id. at 380. The informant told the detective
"that he had seen roughly forty marijuana plants at a house occupied by [the defendants] .
. . [and he] described some details about the growing operation, including its location in a
basement crawl space, and the lighting and drying mechanisms employed." Id. The
detective "prepared an affidavit recounting [the informant's] information and the result of
the DMV check [on the names provided by the informant], which he then submitted as
part of his application for a warrant authorizing the search of defendants' home." Id The
defendants later filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained during the search,
alleging in part "that the warrant should not have issued without some independent
corroboration of the information [the informant] provided." Id The Vermont Supreme
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Court agreed, noting that the detective's "only attempts at corroboration were a drive-by
of the residence, and a DMV check of the names that [the informant] gave him." Id at
383. The court explained that "[w]hile the DMV report did corroborate some of the
peripheral details of [the informant's] story, it did nothing to confirm the allegations of
criminal conduct. Overall, the affidavit provided little evidence that [the detective] had
corroborated [the informant's] information about the marijuana growing operation." Id,
Similarly, in this case, Detective Teerlink failed to corroborate the informant's
allegations of criminal conduct or any incriminating aspects of the tip. In fact, Detective
Teerlink only confirmed that the address listed on Mr. Keener's driver's license matched
the address provided by the informant. This information did not demonstrate that Mr.
Lambson had "knowledge of concealed criminal activity;" rather, it only helped
Detective Teerlink "correctly identify the person whom [Mr. Lambson] mean[t] to
accuse." See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000); see also People v. Scoma, 455
P.2d 419, 424 (Cal. 1969) ("Of no greater assistance is the fact that [the defendant's] past
and present addresses were those provided by the informant; again, no inference of
criminal activity on [the defendant's] part may be drawn.").
Moreover, Detective Teerlink stated in the affidavit that he believed Mr.
Lambson's information "to be accurate and reliable because . . . Daniel Lee Keener has
been arrested for numerous thefts[,] . . . [and] numerous drug charges." See R. 79-81.
However, Mr. Keener's "criminal record also [did] nothing to establish that he is
currently dealing in controlled substances" or otherwise engaged in criminal activity. See
State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Accordingly, Detective
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Teerlink's assertion that he believed the informant's tip to be accurate and reliable based
on Mr. Keener's record of past arrests does not bolster his affidavit in support of probable
cause. Therefore, because Detective Teerlink did not make a significant independent
corroborative effort and did not confirm any of the informant's allegations of criminal
activity, the trial court erred in finding the affidavit was sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause to search Mr. Keener's residence
B. The Detective's Intentional or Reckless Omission of the Informant's
Criminal History in the Affidavit Materially Affected the Finding of
Probable Cause.
"Just as police officers may not include materially false statements in a warrant
affidavit, they similarly cannot omit information that 'materially affects the finding of
probable cause.'" State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ^ 15, 100 P.3d 1222 (quoting
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191). An omission is considered material "[i]f an affidavit fails to
support a finding of probable cause after . . . the omitted information is added." Nielsen,
727 P.2d at 191. If this is the case, "any evidence obtained under the improperly issued
warrant must be suppressed." IdL Because the informant in this case had a criminal
history and was under investigation for attempting to pawn a stolen ring at the time he
provided the tip to Detective Teerlink, he was not an inherently reliable informant.
The failure to disclose an informant's criminal history in an affidavit for a search
warrant has been disapproved of by several state courts. For example, in State v. Bittner,
832 P.2d 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), the defendants appealed their convictions for drug
possession, "contending that the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained during
the execution of a search warrant." Id. at 530. The affidavit for the warrant at issue
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stated that a "concerned citizen" had observed a drug transaction in the defendants'
residence and had later accompanied the detective to this residence, where he "confirmed
that the vehicle [in the driveway] belonged to [one of the defendants]." Id. Although the
detective who prepared the affidavit was aware of the informant's identity, the affidavit
specifically requested "that the identity of the concerned citizen be known only to your
affiant. . . because the concerned citizen fears swift and sure retribution from the suspect
parties." Id However, the affidavit failed to reveal that the informant "had a prior
criminal record of reckless driving and driving while intoxicated, and that he had
previously contacted the police to discuss his impersonation of a police officer." Id.
Although the court found that the affidavit on its face lacked sufficient evidence to
support a finding of probable cause, the court also "note[d] with disapproval the type of
affidavit produced here. The picture of the informant created by the affidavit for a search
warrant was not in accord with the true facts . . . [and] it was error not to have included in
the affidavit that the 'concerned citizen' had previously contacted the sheriffs office
because he had been investigated for a crime. This type of information could influence a
magistrate's decision in assessing the reliability of an informant's tip." Id. at 533. See
also State v. Chenoweth, 158 P.3d 595, 610 (Wash. 2007) (distinguishing Bittner because
"there [was] no showing that the police affiant knew more about [the informant's]
criminal involvement than was disclosed during the warrant application. . . . [and] the
police affiant did not gloss over the informant's identity by characterizing him as a
'concerned citizen' but disclosed his name and known criminal history"); State v.
Goldberg, 872 A.2d 378, 382 (Vt. 2005) (holding that the affidavit failed to demonstrate
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the credibility of the informant and thus did not establish probable cause for a search
warrant, in part because it "failed to describe [the informant's] criminal history.55); Davis
v. State, 637 S.E.2d 431, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that "although it is not clear
whether the omission was intentional, [the detective] was aware of [the informant's]
criminal history and such information should have been provided to the magistrate55);
Brown v. State, 535 S.E.2d 785, 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) ("In order to fully apprise the
magistrate, an officer seeking a warrant should provide the magistrate with any
information relevant to the informant's reliability, including information about his
criminal history or any pending criminal charges.55).
In this case, as in Brttner, "the picture of the informant created by the affidavit for
a search warrant was not in accord with the true facts.55 See Bittaer, 832 P.2d at 530.
The affidavit failed to disclose both Mr. Lambson's criminal history and the fact that he
was under investigation at the time he provided the information to Detective Teerlink.
Mr. Lambson's criminal history, which a search of court records in Utah appears to
include a conviction for possessing/consuming/purchasing alcohol by a minor, class B
misdemeanor, on December 3, 2001; an arrest for aggravated assault on November 11,
2001, which was dismissed due to the witness not being present; convictions for improper
usage of lanes, a class C misdemeanor and operating a vehicle without insurance, a class
B misdemeanor, on January 11, 2005; an arrest for acquiring a controlled substance by
prescription alteration on May 18, 2005, dismissed without prejudice; and, currently
pending charges, unrelated to this case, of 5 second degree felony Theft charges, 1 third
degree felony Theft charge and 3 class A misdemeanor Criminal Mischief charges
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allegedly occurring on November 6, 2004. R. 63-64. Mr. Lambson's criminal history,
along with the fact that he was a suspect in the theft of jewelry, showed he was an
unreliable informant. This constitutes a material omission because these facts, had they
been included in the affidavit, may have significantly influenced the magistrate's
assessment of the reliability of Mr. Lambson's allegations and the ultimate finding of
probable cause. Additionally, the omission of Mr. Lambson's criminal history further
illustrates the intentional or reckless intent of the detective in trying to mislead the court
in establishing probable cause because he was aware that a criminal history might have
some affect on probable cause, as he included Mr. Keener's criminal history in the
affidavit.
Therefore, although the affidavit reveals Mr. Lambson's name, it was error to
misrepresent his identity by characterizing him as a "concerned citizen" and failing to
reveal his criminal history. See People v. Smith, 553 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1976) (noting
that "persons criminally involved or disposed are not regarded as 'citizen-informants'
because they are generally motivated by something other than good citizenship")
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Notably, some state courts have held that the omission of an informant's criminal
history in an affidavit for a search warrant does not necessarily negate a finding of
probable cause, provided that the informant's statements are independently corroborated
by police. See, e.g.. Brown v. State, 535 S.E.2d 785, 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) ("If any
omissions on the part of the officer are offset by independent corroboration of criminal
activity, then the magistrate may still have sufficient information to find that probable
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cause exists."); Davis v. State, 637 S.E.2d 431, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that
because the omission of [the informant's] criminal record was offset by independent
corroboration of criminal activity, reversal [was]]not required."); cf State v. Goldberg,
872 A.2d 378, 379 (Vt. 2005) (holding that "the warrant should not have issued based
solely on an uncorroborated Up from an informant with a significant criminal record"
(emphasis added)). However, not only did the affidavit in this case omit the informant's
criminal history, the affidavit also lacked probable cause because the informant was not
inherently reliable and Detective Teerlink failed to independently corroborate the
allegations of criminal activity.
C. Where The Detective's Misstatements And Omissions Were Intentionally
Or Recklessly False And Material And The Affidavit Otherwise Fails To
Establish Probable Cause, The Evidence Should Be Suppressed.
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held
that a search pursuant to a warrant secured by false statements can violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 155-56. In Franks, the Court
recognized that the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement rests
on the premise "that there will be a truthful showing" of probable cause. If
the trial court finds that a false statement in a warrant affidavit was made
deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth and that the false
statement materially affected the magistrate's determination of probable
cause, "the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search
excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of
the affidavit.
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 14, 100 P.3d 1222 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). Our supreme court extended this reasoning to situations where "a misstatement
occurs because information is omitted." Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191; Krukowski, 2004 UT

36

94 at TJ15. When information has been omitted, "the affidavit must be evaluated to
determine if it will support a finding of probable cause when the omitted information is
inserted." Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. "If an affidavit fails to support a finding of probable
cause after . . . the omitted information is added," then the information that has been
omitted will be considered to "materially affect[] the finding of probable cause, [and] any
evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be suppressed." Id.
As argued above, the affidavit submitted by Detective Teerlink in this case failed
to support a finding of probable cause. See supra Points A & B. Detective Teerlink's
intentional or reckless reference to Mr. Lambson as a "concerned citizen" rather than a
criminal informant, along with the omitted information regarding Mr. Lambson's
criminal history and failure to corroborate the details of the allegations of criminal
activity, materially affected the finding of probable cause. Once the omitted information
regarding Mr. Lambson's status is corrected to reflect that he offered information about
Mr. Keener only after he was picked up and held for questioning by police officers for
trying to pawn a stolen ring, along with his criminal history, then his hearsay statements
used in the affidavit become inherently less reliable. See McArthur, 2000 UT App 23 at
^[31 (noting that an "informant who gains information through criminal activity . . .is
lower on the reliability scale than a citizen informant"(quotations and citation omitted));
Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 956 (noting that unlike those cases where "an informant, after
arrest or confrontation by police, admit[s to] committing criminal offense under
circumstances in which the crimes otherwise would likely have gone undetected" the
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informant in Spillers did not make statements against his penal interest where he "was
caught 'red-handed' with drugs in his possession before naming his purported supplier").
Because Mr. Lambson's hearsay statements alone were unreliable to support a
finding of probable cause, it was necessary for the statements to be independently
corroborated. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at 1J15; Frazier, 423 F.3d at 532 ("[I]n the
absence of any indicia of the informants' reliability, courts insist that the affidavit contain
substantial independent police corroboration."). However, the detectives failed to
corroborate the allegations of criminal conduct or any incriminating aspects of the tip.
The affidavit states that the detective "considered] the information received from the
concerned citizen to be accurate and reliable because" Mr. Lambson provided his name,
date of birth and criminal history and was informed that he would be charged with
interfering in an investigation. R. 80. Instead of relating any independent corroboration
of the hearsay statements, the affidavit states that Mr. Lambson was shown the list of
stolen jewelry taken during the vehicle burglary and he "identified a yellow and white
gold diamond ring and a Blue turquoise stretch bracelet as items he saw in Daniel V.
Keener [Appellant's father] bag of jewelry at the listed residence." R. 80. After listing
the criminal history of Mr. Keener's father, the affidavit simply states that the detective
has confirmed that the address listed on Mr. Keener's drivers license matches the address
provided by Mr. Lambson and states that Mr. Keener "has been arrested for numerous"
charges. R. 80.
The detective's intentional or reckless omission of Mr. Lambson's correct status as
a criminal informant materially affected the finding of probable cause by making the
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hearsay statement appear independently reliable without the need for any corroboration.
Once the misstatement is corrected to reflect that Mr. Lambson's informant status is
unreliable, necessitating significant independent corroboration which the detectives failed
to do, then the Fourth Amendment requires that the evidence be suppressed.
POINT II. EVEN IF PROBABLE CAUSE DID EXIST, UTAH'S
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED
WHERE MISSTATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS HAVE BEEN
INTENTIONALLY OR RECKLESSLY MADE TO THE COURT TO
SECURE A SEARCH WARRANT.
When interpreting the Utah Constitution, this Court has "cited with favor the
traditional methods of constitutional analysis." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, *[[ 37,
162 P.3d 1106. These traditional methods "'look primarily to the language of the
constitution itself but may also look to 'historical and textual evidence, sister state law,
and policy arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to assist us in
arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision in question."5 State v. Gardner, 947
P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1997) (quoting Soc'y of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916,
921 n.6 (Utah 1993)); Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 at ^|37 (citation omitted). This traditional
state constitutional analysis demonstrates that article 1, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution provides Utah citizens with a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth
Amendment.
First, although article 1, section 14 contains the identical language of the Fourth
Amendment, the Utah Supreme Court has "held on more than one occasion that article 1,
section 14 provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, If 12,
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996 P.2d 546; see also Brigham City v. Stuart. 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1950 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that "the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to the
privacy of the home than does the Fourth Amendment"). In fact, the court specifically
noted in State v. Watts that giving "the Utah Constitution a somewhat different
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens
from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the
federal courts." 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988); see also DeBoov, 2000 UT 32 at <f
12 (noting that the Utah Supreme Court "will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a
different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this
state's citizens."); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-18, 420 (Utah 1991)
(suppressing evidence under article I, section 14 of Utah Constitution due to greater
privacy expectation in bank in tax records than under Fourth Amendment); State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469-71 (Utah 1990) (construing article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution to afford greater privacy interests than the Fourth Amendment).
Additionally, the unique history of the early settlers of Utah explains the greater
protection afforded Utah citizens by article 1, section 14 because the drafters of the Utah
Constitution were "acutely concerned with providing protection and remedies against
unlawful searches and seizures." Kenneth R. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and
Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14, 17 J. Contemp.
L. 267, 279 (1991). The Mormon pioneers in Utah suffered severe persecution due to
their religious beliefs and their practice of polygamy in particular, which the federal
government made several attempts to eradicate. See Edwin Brown Firmage & Richard
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Collin Mangrum, Zion in the Courts 161 (1988). As a result, in an effort "to enforce the
anti-polygamy acts of Congress, the Fourth Amendment rights of Mormon pioneers
against unreasonable searches and seizures were continuously violated." Id at 226-27.
Specifically, United States Marshals searching for violators of the anti-polygamy laws
"saw little need" to comply with search warrant requirements and began employing spies,
spotters, and informants in an effort to discover polygamists. Kenneth R. Wallentine,
Heeding the Call: Search and Sezure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article
I, Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. L. 267, 278 (1991). Consequently, as the Utah Supreme
Court noted in DeBooy, 2000 UT 32 at ^ 26, Utah's "early settlers were themselves no
strangers to the abuses of [the warrant requirement]. Underlying the abuse of the []
warrant was the perversion of the prosecutorial function from investigating known crimes
to investigating individuals for the purpose of finding criminal behavior." Id. at ^[26.
Therefore, the historical circumstances surrounding the creation of the Utah Constitution
indicate that the reason for the drafters' decision to include article 1, section 14 was to
provide Utahns with additional protection, ensuring that the Fourth Amendment search
and seizure abuses of the past never repeated themselves.
Finally, Utah is not alone in assuring its citizens a greater expectation of privacy.
Many other state courts have interpreted the search and seizure provisions of their own
constitutions to provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v.
Neal, 164 P.3d 57, 62 (N.M. 2007) (noting that the search and seizure provision of the
New Mexico constitution "has been construed to provide broader protections than the
Fourth Amendment"); State v. Mariano, 160 P.3d 1258, 1268 (Haw.Ct. App. 2007)
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(recognizing that Hawai'i courts are "free to give broader privacy protection than that
given by the federal constitution^] and 'have often extended the protections of the
Hawai'i Constitution beyond those of the United States Constitution^] particularly in the
search-and-seizure context.") (internal citations omitted); Brumfield v. State, 155 P.3d
826? 833 (Okla. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that Oklahoma courts are "free to interpret [the]
state constitution, with its own protection against 'unreasonable searches or seizures,'
more broadly than the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal constitution.");
State v. Malkuch, 154 P.3d 558, 560 (Mont. 2007) (noting that "[t]he Montana
Constitution provides a greater right of privacy than the United States Constitution, and
therefore 'provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in cases involving
searches of private property.'") (internal citation omitted); State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d
1201, 1237 (Wash. 2006) (noting that the inquiry as to whether a search has occurred "is
broader under the state constitution than under the Fourth Amendment"); People v.
Rossman, 140 P.3d 172, 176 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations omitted)
("Although the Colorado and United States Constitutions are generally co-extensive
insofar as they address warrantless searches and seizures, . . . [the search and seizure
provision] of the Colorado Constitution affords broader protections than the Fourth
Amendment.").
In sum, Utah case law, historical circumstances, and the number of other state
courts that interpret their own constitutions more broadly than the Fourth Amendment all
demonstrate that the Utah Constitution provides Utah citizens with greater protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, this Court should evaluate the
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sufficiency of the affidavit under the Utah Constitution so that it can "fulfill its
'responsibility as guardians of the individual liberty of [Utah] citizens.'5' Brigham City,
126 S.Ct. at 1950 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in
Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, If 14, 122 P.3d 506). To this end, under Utah's
Constitution, a search warrant that has been secured by a law enforcement officer making
intentionally or reckless misstatements or omissions in their sworn affidavit must be
invalidated regardless of the presence of probable cause.
In Nielsen, the defendant argued that the search warrant used to search his
residence was invalid under the fourth amendment because the officer made intentional
misstatements in the affidavit. 727 P.2d at 189. In his affidavit, the detective stated that
he had been told by a confidential informant "that an individual living at Nielsen's
address and driving a car with a personalized license plate reading 'Skydive' possessed
one-half pound of cocaine valued at approximately $16,000." Id. at 190. In addition, the
detective stated that he had corroborated the informant's statements and considered them
reliable "because the informant's previous tips had led to the arrests of three individuals
on drug-related charges. Id. Based on the detective's affidavit, a search warrant for
narcotics was issued for Nielsen's residence. Id. At Nielsen's preliminary hearing, the
detective reiterated the statements made in his affidavit concerning the circumstances
establishing probable cause. Id.
The prosecution later revealed that the detective had made false statements in his
affidavit. Id. Specifically, the detective "did not know the informant, had never had any
personal contact with him, and had no personal knowledge of any facts relevant to the
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informant's credibility." Id. On appeal, Nielsen argued that the evidence should be
suppressed because the affidavit containing false statements rendered the search warrant
invalid. Id. The state argued that the detective's "false statements were not made
intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, but were merely
inadvertent technical errors . . . ." Id. at 191. In rejecting the state's argument and
concluding that the detective's statements were made "knowingly false" the court stated
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only of the need for accuracy
in the information provided to a magistrate in support of an application for
a search warrant, but also of the importance of absolute truthfulness in any
statement made under oath.
Id. (emphasis added).
In upholding a search warrant under the fourth amendment, the court noted that
"[d]eterrence of police misconduct is not to be a factor in the decision to suppress [under
the Fourth Amendment] unless the misconduct materially affects the finding of probable
cause." Neilsen, 727 P.2d at 191. However, the court warned "that the federal law as it
has developed since Franks v. Delaware is not entirely adequate." Id. at 192. The issue of
whether "an immaterial, intentional misstatement in an affidavit supporting a warrant
requires suppression of the evidence as a matter of Utah law" has not been decided. Id, at
193. Although the court upheld the warrant under federal law, it cautioned that
"[ujpholding of the warrant under federal law should not be read as an endorsement of
[the detective's] conduct or as a determination of how the issue might be resolved under
the Utah Constitution." Id. at 192-93. The court left open the question of "what the
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appropriate remedy might be if Nielsen had argued that the officer's action violated his
rights under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Id
Recently, the supreme court has reiterated "that Utah's search and seizure
provisions (which are identical to those in the federal constitution) provide 'a greater
expectation of privacy than the fourth amendment as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court.'" Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 at l|f34 (citation omitted). The court has held
that "the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police
violations of article I, section 14" of the Utah Constitution. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460, 472 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion). The court has determined that Utah's
exclusionary rule should be extended in circumstances where "exclusion is necessary to
deter future unconstitutional searches." Sims v. Collection Division of the Utah State
Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6, 13 (Utah 1992) (extending Utah's exclusionary rule to
proceedings under the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act); see also 19 A.L.R. 5th 470 (listing
states that have recognized the existence of an exclusionary rule derived from their state
constitution search and seizure provision). The purpose of Utah's exclusionary rule is not
merely designed to deter police misconduct but exists to vindicate personal privacy rights
and exclude evidence unlawfully obtained. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472.
Given the historical circumstances surrounding the inclusion of article I, section
14 to provide Utahns with additional protection, and ensuring that the fourth amendment
search and seizure abuses of the past never repeated themselves, it follows that
intentional or reckless misstatements or omissions made by a detective misleading a court
about the reliability of the information contained in affidavit in order to secure a search
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warrant is the type of police misconduct and violation of personal privacy rights that was
meant to fall within the protecting perimeters of the this clause. Otherwise, these
constitutional safeguards would quickly lose their prophylactic value. As the supreme
court has recognized,
There is no stronger argument for developing adequate remedies for
violations of the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on
unreasonable searches and seizures than the example of a police officer
deliberately lying under oath in order to obtain a search warrant. To allow
a police officer to obtain a warrant utilizing false information tends to
undermine respect for the legal system and to make the public cynical about
the honesty and professionalism of those entrusted with law enforcement."
Neiisen, 727 P.2d at 192-93.
In this case, Detective Teerlink acknowledged that he was aware that courts
accord informants classified as "concerned citizens" more reliability than they do those
classified as criminal informants. R. 221:26-27. In fact, he testified that he felt it
necessary to used Mr. Lambson's name in the affidavit because "without his name in the
search warrant,... I didn't feel like we had enough probable cause." R. 221:25.
Although Detective Teerlink claimed he did not represent Mr. Lambson as a "concerned
citizen" or omit his criminal history in an effort to "bolster" his credibility, his testimony
acknowledges that he knew that incorrectly labeling Mr. Lambson as a "concerned
citizen" would have that effect. Additionally, Detective Teerlink knew that Mr. Lambson
had been detained after being caught trying to pawn a stolen ring and was facing possible
felony charges in connection with that offense when he gave the information, and also,
that Mr. Lambson had a criminal history. This testimony and the substance of the
affidavit therefore demonstrate that Detective Teerlink acted at least recklessly in
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labeling Mr. Lambson as a "concerned citizen" rather than including accurate and correct
information about Mr. Lambson's status.
The "[inadequate protection]" of the federal law for Utah's citizens from this
type of police misconduct and violation of their personal privacy rights necessitates the
broader protections from Utah's search and seizure clause.
The historical circumstances surrounding the creation of Utah's constitution
demonstrates that it is these very sorts of violations that the state's exclusionary rule was
meant to protect against. Therefore, where a detective intentionally or recklessly
provides misinformation or omits information to secure a search warrant, whether
material or immaterial to showing probable cause, that evidence must be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant, Mr. Keener, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial
court's denial of his motion to suppress, and reverse his conviction.
SUBMITTED this ^j^day of November, 2007.

DEBRA M. NELSON
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Attorneys for Appellant
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Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/12/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST
C/SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD OR
ELDER ADULT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 051909085
Date:
May 04, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
to run consecutive

Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 2 day(s) previously served.
Attorney Fees
Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDERS
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Perform community service hours.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Comply with A/D clauses per AP&P. Defendant is to maintain full
time employment. Defendant is to perform 100 hours of community
Page 2
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Date:
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service in lieu of fine.

Page 3 (last)

TabB

U. S. Constitution Amendment IV
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

STATE OF UTAH)
: ss
County of Salt Lake)

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That your affiant has reason to believe that on the premises known as 849 North Sir Phillip
Drive, further described as a single family residence constructed of brown brick, tan siding and
brown trim. The residence is the seventh structure south of 900 North. The residence is located
on the west side of Sir Phillip Drive and faces to the east. The front door is green in color with a
black metal screen door. The numbers 849 are clearly printed on the left side of the front door
and are brown in color. And all rooms, attics, basements, and other parts therein and the
surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, and outbuildings of any kind located upon
the curtilage of the residence.
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, There is now certain property or evidence described
as:
Jewelry, farther described as a "pave" diamond ring designed with yellow and white gold. The
ring also has a large number of small diamonds. It is described by the owner as a custom "one of
a kind" ring, (see attached list of jewelry and drawing).
Jewelry, further described as a blue turquoise stretch bracelet (see attached list of jewelry)
Jewelry, further described as miscellaneous jewelry stolen in a vehicle burglary at 145 West
Pierpont Avenue on 11/5/2005. (see attached list of jewelry)
Marijuana, farther described as a green leafy substance; material related to the possession or
distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring devices; and drug paraphernalia
described as rolling papers or pipes used for smoking marijuana.
Articles of personal property tending to establish and document sales of stolen jewelry and a
controlled substance including U.S. currency, buyer and seller lists, and other documentation of
sales of stolen jewelry and controlled substances; articles tending to establish the identity of
persons in control of the premises sought to be searched including rent receipts, utility receipts,
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and addressed envelopes, and any other fruits or instrumentality's of the crimes of possession or
distribution of stolen jewelry and controlled substances.
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it
as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of
Possession of Stolen Property, Possession and or Distribution of a Controlled Substance.
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH
WARRANT ARE:
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer for over 5 years.
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Narcotic Unit and
investigates narcotic related offenses. Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and
in the investigation of narcotic related offenses through the Utah Police Academy and the
California Narcotics Association. Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA
Clandestine Laboratory Course. Your affiant has worked street level drug interdiction as an
arresting officer and as an undercover police officer. Your affiant has seen several different types
of narcotics during these operations. Your affiant has been involved with over 400 drug related
cases, many of which were felonies.
Within the last 6 hours your affiant has received information from a concerned citizen named
Gary Lambson. Mr. Lambson stated that there is stolen jewelry at the address of 849 North Sir
Phillip Drive. He also stated that the individuals who reside or otherwise occupy 849 North Sir
Phillip Drive are engaging in an ongoing narcotics distribution operation.
On 12/6/05 Mr. Lambson met with Daniel V. Keener for the purpose of buying jewelry. Daniel
V. Keener traveled with Mr. Lambson to 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. Mr. Lambson was told
that this was Daniel V. Keener's son's residence. The son is named Daniel Lee Keener. Inside
the residence Daniel V. Keener retrieved a bag of jewelry. Mr. Lambson said the bag contained
rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets. Mr. Lambson purchased a ring for $50 from Daniel V.
Keener. Mr. Lambson said Daniel V. Keener put some of the jewelry in his pocket and left most
A^
of the jewelry in the bag at the listed residence.
Aj^\M^
While in the residence of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive, Mr. Lambson observed the following
items on a table in a back room; two large bags of marijuana and a triple beam scale. He said
one of the bags contains chronic marijuana. Chronic is high quality marijuana. The other bag
contains lower grade marijuana. Mr. Lambson said that Daniel Lee Keener is selling the
marijuana out of the listed residence.
On 12/8/05 Mr. Lambson took the ring he purchased to Mike's Custom Jewelry and Repair at
254 East 6400 South for the purpose of selling it. The clerk at Mike's Jewelry recognized the
ring as the one that belongs to another employee of Mike's Jewelry named Julie Baker. Mrs.
Baker identified the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of her vehicle along with
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other jewelry on 11/5/05 at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Salt Lake City case number 05-193011).
The police responded to Mike's Jewelry and questioned Mr. Lambson.
Your affiant showed Mr. Lambson the list of Jewelry stolen during the previously mentioned
vehicle burglary. Mr. Lambson identified a yellow and wrhite gold diamond ring and a Blue
turquoise stretch bracelet as items he saw in Daniel V Keener bag of jewelry at the listed
residence.
Your affiant considers the information received from the concerned citizen to be accurate and
reliable because:
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his name, date of birth and
criminal history. Your affiant informed Mr. Lambson that if he gave your affiant any false
information he would be charged with interfering with an investigation.
Your affiant has checked police and state records and found that Daniel V Keener has been
arrested numerous times for Possession of a Controlled Substance, the most recent arrest was on
5/5/2002. He was also arrested for Carrying a Loaded Fire Arm in a Vehicle on 6/30/89. Your
affiant has also found that Daniel Lee Keener5s drivers license shows the address of 849 North
Sir Phillip Drive. Daniel Lee Keener has been arrested for numerous thefts including an
Aggravated Burglary on 02/26/2000, numerous drug charges (the most recent on 05/12/05) and
Strong Arm Robbery on 10/05/91.
Your affiant desires to enter 849 North Sir Phillip Drive and search for stolen jewelry, marijuana,
marijuana paraphernalia and other items related to the distribution of marijuana.
The
paraphernalia includes such items as pipes, bongs or tubes used to inhale or smoke marijuana.
Other related items include packaging material used to package marijuana and scales used to
weigh quantities. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these items are almost
always found on the premises where search warrants for controlled substances have been
executed.
Your affiant desires to search for records of stolen jewelry and marijuana sales, both written and
electronic, residency papers and U.S. currency. Your affiant knows from past experiences with
narcotic investigations that persons sometimes record their sales to show dates, amounts
purchased and drug indebtedness. Your affiant knows from training and experience that stolen
jewelry and marijuana is sold for U.S. currency. The concerned citizen purchased the stolen ring
with U.S. currency.
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the court
by Deputy District Attorney
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items
any time day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons to wit:
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Your affiant knows from training and experience that persons who sell stolen property or
narcotic distribution operation do not keep regular business hours and commonly sell at night.
Daniel V Keener sold the concerned citizen the stolen ring at night.
The residence your affiant desires to search is located in a residential community. Your affiant
feels that it would be safer for children who may live in the area as well as the other residents of
the neighborhood if the warrant were to be served in the evening hours, during a time when the
pedestrian traffic around the neighborhood is less.
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested search warrant not be required to
give notice of the officer's authority or purpose because:
Physical harm may result to any person if notice was given, and/or the property sought may
quickly be destroyed, disposed of, or secreted.
This danger is believed to exist because:
Daniel V Keener has been arrested for carrying a loaded firearm in a Vehicle. Daniel Lee
Keener has been arrested for Aggravated Burglary and Strong Arm Robbery. Your affiant feels
it would be safer for officers serving the warrant and persons inside the residence if police
officers were not required to give notice before entering the residence.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

l)f<o

-

^

__2005.

v—-Judge of the Third
i
district Court

day of
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In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS SEARCH
WARRANT

vs.
DANIEL L. KEENER,

Case No. 051909085

Defendant.

Hon. Deno G. Himonas

The defendant, Daniel Lee Keener, has filed a motion to suppress "evidence seized pursuant
to the execution of a search warrant." Motion to Suppress Search Warrant and Memorandum in
Support Thereof"(the "Motion"), p. 1. Keener claims that the warrant is infirm because the Affidavit
for Search Warrant did not disclose that the source of much of the information set forth therein was
an individual detained by the police in connection with a "stolen ring," and not a "concerned
citizen," as the affidavit states.1 For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the Motion.2

BACKGROUND
Detectives Michael Hardin and Doug Teerlink are veteran police officers with the Salt Lake
City Police Department, hi December 2005, Hardin was investigating a reported vehicle burglary,
and Teerlink was investigating a potential marijuana distributor.
On December 9, 2005, in connection with their investigations, Detectives Hardin and
Teerlink simultaneously approached Third District Court Judge Judith Atherton and asked that she
issue two search warrants. One of the warrants was for 1381 South Emery Street and the person of
Daniel Vera Keener. The other warrant was for 849 North Sir Phillip Drive, the residence of Daniel
Vern Keener's son, the defendant. Hardin swore to the affidavit for the Emery Street warrant, and
Teerlink swore to the affidavit for the Sir Phillip Drive warrant.
The principal source of information for both affidavits is an individual named Gary Lambson.
Both affidavits describe Lambson as a "concerned citizen"; however, the affidavit sworn to by
*For the "concerned citizen" reference, see the Affidavit for Search Warrant of Detective Doug
Teerlink ("Teerlink Affidavit"). For the "stolen ring" reference, see the Affidavit for Search Warrant of
Detective Michael Hardin ("Hardin Affidavit"). Both affidavits are attached to the Motion.
2

The Motion came on for hearing on October 11, 2006. Jacey Skinner represented the State;
Andrea Garland represented Keener, who was also present.
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Detective Hardin also notes that Murray Police had detained Lambson "concerning a stolen ring."
Hardin Affidavit, p. 2.
Lambson told Detective Hardin that he had "purchased the ring from" Daniel Vern Keener.
Id. More specifically, Lambson told Hardin that on December 6, 2005, he "met with Daniel Vern
Keener for the purpose of buying jewelry." Id. To this end, Lambson traveled with Daniel Vern
Keener "to 849 North Sir Phillip Drive," Daniel Lee Keener's residence. Id. Once "[i]nside the [Sir
Phillip Drive] residence," Daniel Vern Keener "retrieved a bag of jewelry" that "contained rings,
necklaces, watches, and bracelets." Id. Lambson purchased the ring "for $50." Id. Lambson also
told Hardin that Daniel Vern Keener "left most of the jewelry in the bag at" the Sir Phillip Drive
address. Id.
On December 8, 2005, Lambson attempted to sell the ring at Mike's Custom Jewelry and
Repair. The clerk recognized the ring as one that belonged to "another employee of Mike's Jewelry
named Julie Baker." Id. "Baker identified the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of
her vehicle along with other jewelry" on November 5, 2005, "at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Salt
Lake City case number 05-193011)." Id.
Detective Hardin then showed Lambson a "list of the jewelry [reported] stolen" from
Baker's vehicle. Id. (A copy of the list is attached to the detective's affidavit.) Lambson identified
two pieces as items he saw in the "bag of jewelry at the residence located" on North Sir Phillip
Drive-"a yellow and white gold diamond ring and a Blue [sic] turquoise stretch bracelet." Id.
Lambson also told the detectives that "[wjhile in the residence of 849 North Sir Phillip
Drive," he saw "two large bags of marijuana and a triple beam scale" sitting "on a table in a back
room." Teerlink Affidavit, p. 2. According to Lambson, "one of the bags contained] chronic
marijuana." Id. ("Chronic is a high quality marijuana." Id.)
The detectives considered the information provided by Lambson "to be accurate and
reliable." Id., p. 3. For reasons, the detectives noted, among others, thafLambson provided them
with his "name, date of birth and criminal history" and that they placed him on notice that they
would charge him with criminal conduct if any of the information he gave them turned out to be
false. Id.
ANALYSIS
Keener contends that the execution of the search warrant on his residence violated Article
I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Court first examines Keener's contention under the Utah constitution. See State V. Holm, 2006
UT 31, P 33,137 P.3d 726 ("Because this court has endorsed the primacy approach to constitutional
challenges, whereby we first attempt to resolve the constitutional challenges by appealing to our
state constitution before turning to the federal constitution. . . ."); see also Sinead McLoughlin,
High Court Study; Choosing a "Primacy" Approach: Chief Justice Christine M. Durham
2

Advocating States Rights in Our Federalist System, 65 ALB. L. REV. 1161 (2002). Because the
state constitutional analysis is dispositive, the Court does not address Keener's federal challenge.3
The primary question the Motion presents is whether an "intentional misstatement in an
affidavit supporting a warrant," whether the misstatement be material or immaterial, "requires
suppression of the evidence" under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution. State v. Nielsen,
727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986). Because the Court finds no misstatement, the question remains
open.
Had Detective Teerlink's affidavit stood alone, his characterization of Lambson as a
"concerned citizen" would be troubling to the court. But it did not stand alone; rather, it was
submitted alongside Detective Hardin's affidavit, which pointed out that Lambson had been
"detained by Murray Police" regarding "a stolen ring." Hardin Affidavit, p. 2. That reference in
Detective Hardin's affidavit, combined with Detective Teerlink's knowledge that Judge Atherton
would be reviewing both his and Detective Hardin's affidavits together, dispelled any potential false
impression. It is as if the detectives defined "concerned citizen" to mean Gary Lambson, a person
of interest detained by the authorities.4
The secondary question is whether, assuming the accuracy of the "concerned citizen "
reference, the Teerlink Affidavit provided Judge Atherton with probable cause to issue the search
warrant for the Sir Phillip Drive residence. "Where a search warrant supported by an affidavit is
challenged as having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause,... [the court's]
review focuses on the magistrate's probable cause determination." State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104,
P 14, 48 P.3d 872 (citations omitted). "In reviewing the magistrate's decision, . . . [the court]
assess[es] whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause
existed." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Further, the court affords "the magistrate's decision
great deference and considers] the affidavit relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a
common sense fashion." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Having reviewed Teerlink's Affidavit in its entirety, the court concludes that Judge
Atherton "had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed and that evidence of
illegal conduct would be found at the" Sir Phillip Drive location. Id., P 16. The Teerlink Affidavit
contained a detailed account of a transaction at the Sir Phillip Drive residence involving the
purchase of reportedly stolen merchandise. It also contained an account of the existence of
3

The parties agree that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution does not provide less
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Therefore, a finding that the Sir Phillip Drive warrant was constitutionally permissible
under a state constitutional analysis necessarily means that it was permissible under a federal
constitutional analysis too.
4

The State suggests that it was more accurate for the detectives to refer to Lambson as a
"concerned citizen" than an "informant" as the detectives promised Lambson nothing in exchange for the
infonnation.
3

marijuana that was specific as to quantity, type, and location. This particularized information,
combined with the fact that the detectives knew Lambson's identity and disclosed it, that Lambson
obtained his information first-hand, and that he was willing to stand behind the information despite
being threatened with prosecution if it turned out to be false provides the requisite substantial basis.
See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App. 1993) (probable cause found where "no
indication in the facts that the [confidential] informant received anything from the police in
exchange for the information" and where the information was "based on personal observation" and
"substantiated.").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the Motion.5 The matter is referred back to
Judge Atherton for any further proceedings.
h

DATED this _g_ day of November, 2006.
BY THE COURT

5

The court is of the opinion that additional oral argument would not be helpful; therefore, it is
striking the hearing in this matter currently set for November 17, 2006.
4
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
STATE OF UTAH)
: ss
County of Salt Lake)
The undersigned affiant-being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
that on the premises known as 1381 South Emery Street, a single family dwellmg, located on the
east side of Emery and faces to the west. It is the third structure south of Utahna and is brown
brick, with white shutters. The front door is brown with a white screen door. The numbers
6
13 81' are black and painted on thefrontstairs; to include all rooms, attics, basements, and other
parts therein and the surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, and outbuildings of
any kind located upon the curtilage of the property.
And on the person known as Daniel Vern Keener a white male adult D.O.B. 05-19-1954,
approximately 5'10" and 190 pounds with grey hair;
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, there is now certain property or evidence described
as:
An Anne Klein wrist watch described as a silver colored watch with a black face, with the name
of'Anne Klein' printed on the face,
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it
as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of
Burglary and Possession of Stolen Property.
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH
WARRANT ARE:
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer for over 9 years.
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Burglary Unit and
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investigates burglary and theft related offenses. Your affiant has had training which includes the
Utah police Academy, and other POST certified investigative training, which included training
concerning property crimes.
Your affiant was contacted by Murray City Detectives concerning a person detained JFoj
possession of a ring which was taken during a vehicle burglary in Salt Lake City on November 6,
2005. At the time of this burglary a large amount of jewelry was taken including a Anne Klein
watch, a Pave diamond ring, a Tiffany necklace with 'Tiffany' inscribed on the necklace and
matching bracelet, a Omega yellow gold necklace, a diamond yellow gold tennis bracelet, a
diamond cross necklace in white gold, turquoise necklace blue with small brown beads, red and
silver earrings, an antique white gold ring with a pink sapphire stone, a silver and pink ring with
cubic zirconias, a blue and silver ring with cubic zirconias, and yellow gold diamond stud
earrings.
Other property taken in the burglary include the victims clothing, Ipod mp3 player, Louis
Vuitton bags, 'Mac' makeup, Louis Vuitton sunglasses, among other items on attached list.
Within the last 6 hours your affiant interviewed Gary Lambson, who was detained by Murray
Police, concerning a stolen ring. Mr. Lambson stated that he purchased the ring from the suspect Daniel V Keener who lives at 1381 South Emery Street.
On 12/6/05 Mr. Lambson met with Daniel V Keener for the purpose of buying jewelry. Daniel
V Keener traveled with Mr. Lambson to 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. Mr. Lambson was told that
this was Daniel V Keener's son's residence. The son is named Daniel Lee Keener. Inside the
residence Daniel V Keener retrieved a bag of jewelry. Mr. Lambson said the bag contained
rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets. Mr. Lambson purchased a ring for $50 from Daniel V
Keener.
Mr. Lambson said that Daniel V Keener put some of the jewelry to include the listed Anne Klein
wrist watch in his pocket and left most of the jewelry hi the bag at the listed residence. Daniel V.
Keener then traveled back to his residence at 1381 South Emery St
On 12/8/05 Mr. Lambson took the ring to Mike's Custom Jewelry and Repair at 254 East 6400
South for the purpose of selling it. The clerk at Mike's Jewelry recognized the ring as the one
that belongs to another employee of Mike's Jewelry named Julie Baker. Mrs. Baker identified
the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of her vehicle along with other jewelry on
11/5/05 at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Salt Lake City case number 05-193011). Murray police
Officer Stallings responded to Mike's Jewelry and questioned Mr. Lambson. Officer Stallings
contacted your affiant who responded to The Murray Police station and interviewed Mr.
Lambson and obtained the above information.
Your affiant showed Mr. Lambson the list of Jewelry stolen during the previously mentioned
vehicle burglary. Mr. Lambson identified a yellow and white gold diamond ring and a Blue
turquoise stretch bracelet as items he saw in Daniel V Keener bag of jewelry at the residence
located on 849 North Sir Phillip Dr. residence.
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Your affiant considers the information received from the concerned citizen to be accurate and
reliable because:
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his name, date of birth and
criminal history. Gary Lambson has provided your affiant information against his best interest.
Your affiant has independently verified the information that Mr. Lambson has provided and
found it to be true to the best of your affiants knowledge. Your affiant informed Mr. Lambson
that if he gave your affiant any false information he would be charged with interfering with an
investigation.
MrHLambson also stated that within the last 36 hours, he was in the residence at 1381 South
Emery Street While in the residence he observed several packages of methamphetamine and
knows the persons who live at or otherwise occupy the listed residence to be using
methamphetamine. Mr. Lambson also stated that within the last 48 hours he overheard Daniel V
Keener stating that he had a shotgun.
Your affiant knows from training and experience that persons who use methamphetamine often
exhibit unpredictable, paranoid and potentially violent behavior while under the influence of the
stimulant.
Your affiant verified Mr. Lambsons information by checking police and state records and found
that J)am'el V TCeener has been arrested numerous times for Possession of a Controlled
Substance, the most recent arrest was on 5/5/2002. He was also arrested for Carrying a Loaded
Firearm in a Vehicle on 6/30/89. Your affiant has also found that Daniel Lee Keener's drivers
license shows the address of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. Daniel has been arrested for numerous
thefts including an Aggravated Burglary on 02/26/2000, numerous drug charges (the most recent
on 05/12/05) and Strong Arm Robbery on 10/05/91.
Jfour affiant checked police records on Daniel V Keener and showed a picture to Mr. Lambson
who confirmed that this was the same individual that he/she made contact with while at the listed
residence. Daniel V Keener has extensive criminal history, some of which includes possession
of different controlled substances on multiple occasions, thefts, forgeries and assault.
Narcotic Detectives have conducted surveillance of the residence at 1381 South Emery St and
observed 2 females leave the listed address and get into Utah listing 160YZK. That vehicle is
listed to Brian Lybarger. Your affiant checked state records on Brian who has aggravated
robbery, robbery, multiple thefts, assault, possession of controlled substances, possession of
weapon and forgery. Your affiant talked with Agent Olive with AP&P who located a Tammy
Lybarger 1381 South Emery Street who is currently on paper with AP&P. Tammy has carrying
a concealed weapon, threatening with a weapon, use of a dangerous weapon during a fight,
carrying concealed weapon, forgeries, possession of meth and other controlled substance charges
and forgery.
Your affiant desires to enter 1381 South Emery Street; and search for a Anne Klein watch, a
Pave diamond ring, a Tiffany necklace with 'Tiffany' inscribed on the necklace and matching
bracelet, a Omega yellow gold necklace, a diamond yellow gold tennis bracelet, a diamond cross
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necklace in white gold, turquoise necklace blue with small brown beads, red and silver earrings,
an antique white gold ring with a pink sapphire stone, a silver and pink ring with cubic zirconias,
a blue and silver ring with cubic zirconias, and yellow gold diamond stud earrings, clothing, Ipod
mp3 player, Louis Vuitton bags, 'Mac' makeup, Louis Vuitton sunglasses, among other items on
attached list
Your affiant also desired to search Daniel Vem Keener a white male adult D.O.B. 05-19-1954,
approximately 5' 10" and 190 pounds with grey hair, for the above described property which Mr.
Lambson observed on the suspect Daniel V Keener.
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the court
by Deputy District Attorney &)& hr<^ t/' // 5.
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search wan*ant be issued for the seizure of said items
anytime day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons to wit:
The premises which your affiant desires to search is located in a residential community. Your
affiant has observed children playing in the area near the listed premises during the daylight
hours. Your affiant has watched the premises during the evening hours and has noted that the
pedestrian Traffic near the Hsted residence appears to be considerably less during the evening
hours. Your affiant has observed other residents of the community walking in close proximity to
the Hsted premises. Your affiant feels that it would be safer for children who may live in the area
as well as the other residents of the community if the warrant were to be served in the evening
hours, during a time when children were not present and the pedestrian traffic around the
grounds seemed to be less.
Your affiant has also noted that there are businesses in the area of the Hsted residence. These
businesses are open during the daytime hours and appear to have a large amount of business
related traffic, which travels in close proximity to the listed address. Your affiant has watched
the premises during the evening hours and has not noted that there is a decrease in such activity.
A majority of the businesses in the area are closed during the evening hours. Your affiant feels
that it would be safer for patrons of the nearby businesses as weU as the other residents of the
neighborhood if the warrant were to be served in the evening hours, during a time when
pedestrian traffic around the Hsted premises seemed to be less.
Your affiant beHeves it is necessary for search teams to get as close as possible to the named
premises before being discovered because persons involved in an on-going narcotics distribution
operation wiH attempt to destroy the narcotics if they beHeve the narcotics wiH be discovered by
law enforcement personnel. Your affiant beHeves the cover of darkness will allow search teams
to get as close as possible to the premise before being discovered.
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested search warrant not be required to
give notice of the officer's authority or purpose because:
Physical harm may result to any person if notice was given, and/or the property sought may
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quickly be destroyed, disposed of, or secreted.
This danger is believed to exist because:
Your affiant has been informed by Mr. Lambson that there is electronic counter-surveillance
equipment mounted above the doors. Your affiant knows through training and experience that
this kind of activity is used as a way to forewarn of police action and that person(s) employing
counter-surveillance are doing so in an attempt to flee or use force to impede officers attempts to
enter the listed premises or to destroy or conceal contraband
Your affiant has learned from other Narcotic Detectives that there is active human countersurveillance from this address. Occupants have been observed looking out windows and coming
out the front door and watching up and down the street when vehicles come onto the street.
The persons living at or otherwise frequenting the listed address are abusing stimulants, namely
methamphetamine. Your affiant knows through training and experience that persons who use
stimulants often exhibit unpredictable, paranoid and potentially violent behavior while under the
influence of the stimulant. Your affiant believes the ability to quickly secure the drug users in
the listed premises will assist in preventing the physical harm to any person during the execution
of this warrant.
Your affiant has found histories on many of those residing at the listed address. Many of these
criminal histories include, drug related charges, assaults and weapon violations.
7S?*<£

Detective Michael Hardin
Affiant
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